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The Impact of U.S. Federal Laws on Sectoral Integration
by Peter 0. Suchman *
I. INTRODUCTION
M y subject deals with Federal laws and the impact they may have on a
sectoral or comprehensive trade agreement with Canada. I will focus
on four principle areas of U.S. law:
1. the negotiating authority itself, which can have a very substantial
effect on the substance of an arrangement;
2. U.S. customs law, particularly the Rules of Origin, which will be
a critical element of implementation of any agreement;
3. the trade remedy laws, including both "fair" and "unfair" trade
laws; and
4. government procurement, focusing on the agricultural
restrictions.
To begin it is necessary to understand that the principal difficulties
with achieving sectoral or comprehensive integration between U.S. and
Canadian industry are not legal but economic, commercial, and most im-
portantly, political. Once it has been decided as a matter of policy by
both governments to move toward integration and the creation of a
North American market, the major task of both administrations will be
to identify the likely commercial and economic consequences. Further,
they will have to convince the legislatures that the overall gains outweigh
the costs to such an extent that dislocations to individual enterprises and
workers are worth enduring. Legal impediments to integration can then
be quickly dealt with at the federal level, although the relationships be-
tween federal and local (i.e., state and provincial) governments under the
constitutional systems of both countries may prove a problem. These
problems will occur primarily in the areas of government procurement
and trade in services, such as banking, insurance, and the professions.
In this paper I attempt to identify the most meaningful U.S. laws
which would need to be scrutinized if U.S.-Canadian free-trade arrange-
ments are to be pursued. I have largely ignored any distinction between
sectoral and comprehensive integration because it does not appear the
sectoral approach is favored by either government, and because the issues
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to be addressed would largely remain the same in either circumstance
(although product specific issues, such as standards, could become
troublesome within particular sectors).
Before exploring the U.S. statutes which might be impacted by a
U.S.-Canada free-trade arrangement, it is worth noting that in 1984 Can-
ada enjoyed a substantial bilateral trade surplus with the U.S., about $20
billion, which constituted over 16% of the total U.S. trade deficit that
year ($123 billion). Until, or unless, there is a significant weakening of
the U.S. dollar (which has been trading at all time highs against the Ca-
nadian dollar and most other currencies) it seems unlikely that there will
be any improvement in the U.S. trade balance, either bilaterally with
Canada or multilaterally.
In fact, further deterioration in the U.S. position remains distinctly
possible. While most attention has thus far been focused on the Japanese
trade surplus with the U.S. ($37 billion in 1984), it is to be expected,
should a U.S.-Canada arrangement become the focus of public attention
during the present imbalance, that considerable pressure against any re-
duction in trade barriers will be generated. From the Canadian perspec-
tive, it might be best not to draw attention to Canada's current favorable
bilateral position, by pursuing such an arrangement, until there is a re-
turn to equilibrium.
In a recent article on U.S.-Canada trade relations, the Canadian
Minister for International Trade, Mr. James Kelleher, discussed the pos-
sibility of a comprehensive bilateral free-trade arrangement. He indi-
cated that a thorough analysis concerning trade negotiating authorities,
tariff and customs law, trade remedy and fair trade laws, and other im-
port regulations, will first be required. What are those U.S. laws, regula-
tions, and practices which have the greatest impact on Canadian market
access to the U.S., and which will therefore become an important part of
any negotiations for a U.S.-Canadian free-trade arrangement?
II. U.S. NEGOTIATING AuTHORITY
The Trade and Tariff Act of 19841 provides the President with au-
thority to enter into agreements and to eliminate or reduce duties, non-
tariff barriers, and other distorting practices on a bilateral basis. Most
importantly, in amending section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974,2 the 1984
Act provides for the "fast-track" Congressional approval procedure.
(Foreign governments understand the President has inherent Constitu-
tional authority to negotiate concerning matters of mutual interest. It is
the implementation of an agreement through domestic law which causes
difficulty for the Executive branch and trepidation on the part of other
countries.)
The procedures in section 401 of the 1984 Tariff and Trade Act are
1 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub L. No 98-573, 19 U.S.C.S. §1654 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
2 Trade Act of 1974, U.S.C.S. §2112 (Law. Co-op 1985).
[Vol. 10:141 1985]
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presently being utilized to implement the U.S.-Israeli Free Trade Ar-
rangement, which provides for the staged elimination of all tariffs on Is-
raeli goods imported into the United States. The importance of the "fast-
track" legislative procedure is that it prevents particular interest groups
and industries, who believe that they are being adversely affected by the
agreement, from holding the legislation approving the agreement hostage
to their demands. Since the legislation cannot be amended or bottled up
in committee once formally submitted to the Congress, it guarantees the
agreement will receive a straight up or down vote by the Congress. This
is what happened with the legislation implementing the MTN, the Tokyo
Round.
Negotiations with interest groups occur, for the most part, prior to
passage of the legislation authorizing "fast-track" approval, and during
the consultation and notification periods prior to the formal signing of
the agreement and submission of the implementing legislation to the
Congress. Foreign governments can therefore be fairly certain that un-
less products are excluded from coverage in the original authorizing leg-
islation, their negotiated duty reductions will in fact be implemented.
Thus, the U.S. textile industry and unions, along with some other import
sensitive industries, launched a major effort to exclude textile and apparel
products from section 401 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, when that
legislation was before the Congress last year. They were unsuccessful in
excluding those products, and as a result the U.S.-Israeli arrangement
provides for the eventual elimination of all tariffs on Israeli imports (and,
conversely, on U.S. exports to Israeli.)
However, we must be careful in looking at this "fast-track" proce-
dure. It does not exclude the possibility that the U.S. implementing leg-
islation, even under "fast-track" procedures, may deviate from the terms
foreign trading partners believe they have secured. As noted, the consul-
tation and notification periods required under this procedure do allow for
the exertion of Congressional influence, in the formulation of the imple-
menting legislation to be submitted by the Executive branch. This is es-
pecially true with regards to modifications to U.S. trade remedy laws or
other domestics laws effecting imports, as opposed to straight tariff re-
ductions. Since the concept of total elimination of duties on a bilateral
basis for all products has been accepted, hopefully that issue is closed.
This is not the case with regard to non-tariff barriers. The respective
Congressional committees, (the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee) feel that in order to fully exercise
their oversight responsibilities, they will need to thoroughly sift through
any proposed changes in U.S. law during the pre-submission
consultations.
This is certainly what happened in 1979, when the Senate Finance
Committee had a major role in formulating the legislation (which became
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979) implementing the Tokyo Round
codes on antidumping and countervailing duty laws. It can be argued
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that the statutory language amending the U.S. antidumping and counter-
vailing laws, particularly with regard to the definition of material injury,
was not exactly what the trading partners of the U.S. had bargained for.
For instance, it is generally believed that the intervention of representa-
tives of the U.S. steel industry, during the consultation period before
Congress, prevented clarification of the statutory language in regard to
causality. As a result, a majority of the commissioners of the U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC), the body which applies the injury test
in U.S. dumping and countervailing duty investigations, have refused to
consider whether the amount of subsidization in a countervailing duty
investigation has caused injury. They look only to whether the subsi-
dized imports themselves have caused injury, despite specific assurance
to the contrary by U.S. negotiators during the countervailing duty code
negotiations.
On the whole, however, the "fast-track" procedures of the Trade
Act of 1974, as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, are far
superior to the alternative means of implementing any bilateral arrange-
ment. Under section 401 of the Act, in order to qualify for "fast-track"
treatment the President must consult with the appropriate committees of
Congress during the negotiating process, and notify Congress of his in-
tention to enter into the agreement ninety days before doing so. At least
sixty days before the formal notification, a pre-notification must be given,
during which either Committee can disapprove of the proposed agree-
ment. Finally, the President must submit the agreement and its imple-
menting legislation to the Congress. The Committees must then report
the bill out within forty-five days. Each House then has fifteen days to
vote on the legislation without amending it.
As noted, while these procedures are cumbersome, the alternative is
to negotiate an Executive Agreement which then must be implemented
through the regular legislative process. This was the method attempted,
with disastrous results, after the Kennedy Round, to implement the
agreement on the elimination of American Selling Price and the An-
tidumping Code. But, it was also the method used successfully to imple-
ment the Auto Agreement. One can see that it has mixed results.
Another option is to seek advanced authority to negotiate and im-
plement specific changes in U.S. law. This has been done traditionally
with tariff reductions, but not with other modifications to U.S. law. It
was attempted in 1973 (apparently to avoid the disastrous results of the
Kennedy Round) when the Nixon administration sought advanced au-
thority to eliminate the American Selling Price and Final List methods of
customs valuation, and the Wine Gallon/Proof Gallon method of assess-
ing excise taxes on imported spirits. The attempt failed. I believe that
was the last (perhaps the only) time that the Executive branch has sought
such advanced "non-tariff barrier" authority. It appears that the Con-
gress is more comfortable agreeing in advance to the reduction or elimi-
nation of tariffs, where considerable precedent exists and the bargain is
[Vol. 10:141 1985]
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more or less quantifiable, than it is authorizing the elimination or modifi-
cation of a provision of law which impacts imports, such as a non-tariff
barrier. In such an instance the Congress wants to see the deal before
giving final approval. As a result, the "fast-track" method has evolved,
and would appear the only likely procedure for implementation of a free-
trade arrangement, whether sectoral or comprehensive. Basically, it
seems the House Ways and Means Committee, and the House in general,
would be very upset if a deal were worked out for a treaty which elimi-
nated them from the approval process altogether.
III. CUSTOMS LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
Tariffs on approximately three-quarters of Canada-U.S. trade will be
set at a zero rate after the Tokyo Round tariff cuts are completely imple-
mented in January, 1987. However, duties in a number of important
trade sectors, such as steel, will continue to be significant. Thus, a free-
trade agreement eliminating all duties would have a major impact on
certain industries. Although, since the industries with the most protec-
tion are the most import sensitive, pressure will be greatest to exclude
from an agreement those products which have the highest duties. One
question to be addressed is whether the increase in duty-free imports
from Canada will affect the administration of U.S. Customs laws and
procedures.
A U.S.-Canada free-trade agreement will likely increase the burden
on Canadian exporters and U.S. importers to submit evidence of the
country of origin for imports to the U.S. On the other hand, classifica-
tion and value data will be of decreased importance to Customs. Typi-
cally, commercial products must be accompanied, when imported, by a
bill of lading, invoice, and visa if the goods are subject to quota. At the
time they enter the U.S., the importer submits a Form 7501 to Customs
describing the goods and giving its TSUS classification item number.
Customs then inspects some of the goods for compliance with all U.S.
regulations, including trademark, copyright, and health and safety. The
importer must submit a customs bond for payment of estimated duties at
the time of entry. The import specialist has ten days to determine if the
goods are properly classified, and submits a bill to the importer for duties
due.
Customs administration, with regard to Canadian made products,
will be simplified by a free-trade agreement because Customs will no
longer be involved in the collection of duties. This would eliminate the
need for submission of estimated duties and the goods conceivably could
be liquidated at the time of entry. Importers would continue to submit
the invoices and bills of lading to Customs for statistical purposes. How-
ever, there would undoubtedly be a requirement for the submission of a
certification as to the country of origin, where goods are duty-free be-
cause of their Canadian origin.
5
Suchman: The Impact of U.S. Federal Laws on Sectoral Integration
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1985
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
This is an area where there has been a tremendous amount of heat,
but very little light, in the United States recently. The certification of the
country of origin is not a new problem to U.S. Customs, it is something
that we are familiar with under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs. Failure to pres-
ent the appropriate form will mean, in the case of Canadian goods, that
the merchandise will be treated as dutiable.
The country of origin issues involving duty free goods have been
addressed in the CBI and GSP legislation and most recently in the stat-
ute authorizing the U.S.-Israeli Free Trade Arrangement. It is likely that
country of origin issues would become the most significant aspect of Cus-
toms administration under a U.S.-Canada free-trade agreement. And, it
is not unreasonable to conclude that an agreement of any sort would
track these previous arrangements, most probably the CBI and Israeli
Arrangement because they depart from the GSP procedure in one very
important way.
In the CBI and Israeli Arrangement it is possible for up to 15% of
the value added requirement to be met by U.S. content. Section
402(a)(1) of the Tariff and Trade Act of 1984, which contains the rules of
origin for the Israeli Agreement, states:
[F]or the reduction or elimination of any duty...
(A) (the) article must be the growth, product or manufacture of
Israel or. . . a new or different article of commerce that has been
grown, produced or manufactured in Israel; (and)
(C) the sum of
(i) the cost of value of the material produced in Israel, plus
(ii) the direct cost of processing operations performed in
Israel, is not less than 35% of the appraised value of such
article at the time it is entered. If the cost or value of materi-
als produced in the customs territory of the United States is
included...an amount not to exceed 15% of the appraised
value of the article at the time it is entered that is attributed
to such United States cost or value may be applied toward
determining the percentage ...
What this means in practical terms is, given a product the entered
value of which is 100, 15 can be U.S. value, 20 can be Israeli value and
the rest can come from Taiwan-it will still qualify as an Israeli good (if,
under Section 402(a)(1)(A), it is "a new or different article of commerce
that has been grown, produced or manufactured in Israeli," i.e., if a sub-
stantial transformation has been made).
What is "substantial transformation"? The application of the term
"substantial transformation" to the country of origin tests in these stat-
utes may be dramatically affected by the textile rules of origin recently
promulgated as regulations by the U.S. Customs service.3 If, in fact,
3 43 Fed. Reg. 8,710 (March 5, 1985).
[Vol. 10:141 1985]
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these rules are applied to all imported products, as some U.S. Customs
officials have hinted, the test to determine whether products qualify for
duty-free treatment under these statutes (and, presumably, under any
U.S.-Canadian agreement) would be radically altered.
The rules provide that, in the case of an article which consists in
whole or in part of materials which originated or were processed in an-
other foreign country (or territory), the article must have been substan-
tially transformed in the latter country to be deemed a product of that
country. That is not new; that has always been the test and I believe that
is the test in Canada as well. The problem is in the definition of "sub-
stantial transformation."
The new regulations provide the following specific criteria for the
operations necessary to substantially transform an article to apply, l e.,
for it to become a "new or different article":
(1) A new and different article of commerce will usually result from a
manufacturing or processing operation if there is a change in:
(i) commercial designation or identity; or
(ii) fundamental character; or
(iii) commercial use.
But these are not new, either. This is the standard definition of "substan-
tial transformation." What is new is the following:
(2) In determining whether merchandise has been subjected to a sub-
stantial manufacturing or processing operation, the following will be
considered:
(i) the physical change in the material or article as a result of the
manufacturing or processing operations [in each foreign territory
or country, or insular possession of the United States];
(ii) the time involved in the manufacturing or processing opera-
tions [ . .];
(iii) the complexity of the manufacturing or processing operations[. •.3
(iv) the level or degree of skill and/or technology required in the
manufacturing or processing operations [. .];
(v) the value added to the article or material in each foreign terri-
tory or country, or insular possession of the United States, com-
pared to its value when imported into the United States.
These textile rules impose a new and additional precondition that
must be met, in addition to the traditional test of "substantial transfor-
mation," before merchandise grown or produced in one country and
processed in a second country can be considered as having its origin in
the second country. In addition to the tests evolved through court inter-
pretations of the regulations, which defined "substantial transformation"
on the basis of whether the product has been transformed into a new and
different article of commerce, the Customs Service proposes to add a re-
quirement that the process by which an article is transformed into a dif-
ferent product must meet an independent standard of "substantiality."
7
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This latter test, in simplistic terms, is a quantitative comparing of the
costs and complexities of the manufacturing process to the value of the
article at the time that it is first subjected to that process.
No one is quite certain what these new criteria will mean if and
when they are applied to all products, and it is safe to anticipate a period
of great uncertainty, which will be troublesome at a time when interna-
tionalization of industry has become commonplace. The establishment
of a U.S.-Canada free-trade arrangement would unquestionably lead to
the rationalization and restructuring of some industries. The uncertainty
caused by the application of new country of origin rules by U.S. Customs
will slow that process down whenever it involves the use of third country
imports or very significant U.S. manufacturing processes.
It would be possible under these new rules for a Canadian manufac-
turing process which adds 20% or more to the value of U.S. produced
imports, and which meets the substantial transformation test by produc-
ing a new and different product, to fail to meet the new substantial
processing test. These goods then become dutiable. The solution, of
course, is to make sure when this agreement is negotiated that U.S. con-
tent should not be considered dutiable under any circumstances.
The zeal of the Customs Service in seeking to analyze manufactur-
ing and processing operations under the standards set forth in these regu-
lations, and the extent to which the rest of the U.S. government allows
Customs to exercise its discretion in the administration of these rules
will, in large measure, determine whether the natural economic conse-
quences of integration are to be at least partially frustrated.
IV. TRADE REMEDY LAWS
It is arguable that the most significant legal barriers to trade be-
tween the U.S. and Canada for most products are the trade remedy laws
of the respective countries. Certainly, neither has been hesitant to take
strong and frequent action to protect its domestic producers from "inju-
rious" imports of one sort or another from its neighbor across the border.
In the past twenty years, the U.S. has issued antidumping orders on thir-
teen Canadian products.4
4 The following have been the U.S. antidumping duty determinations against Canadian
products:
Carbon steel bars/Structural shapes (1964);
Choline chloride (1984);
Elemental sulphur (1972);
Ice cream sandwich wafers (1971);
Methyl alcohol (1978-81);
Pig iron (1969);
Potassium Chloride (1967);
Racing plates (1973);
Self-propelled bituminous paving equipment (1977);
Steel jacks (1965);
[Vol. 10:141 1985]
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In 1984, imports of these products, with most of the orders still in
place, amounted to over $900 million. Obviously, these imports would
have been at a much higher level but for the threat of antidumping duties
and the administrative burdens imposed by an outstanding dumping find-
ing. Let me illustrate. In 1977 U.S. imports of methyl alcohol from Can-
ada were about 54 thousand gallons. In 1978, imports were 51 thousand
gallons. In 1979, there was a finding of dumping, with a margin of
59.2%. Imports that year dropped to 35 thousands gallons, to 21 thou-
sand in 1980, and 11.7 thousand in 1981. The antidumping order was
revoked in August, 1981, and imports the next year rose to over 45 thou-
sand gallons.
Similarly, Canadian antidumping determinations have been impor-
tant barriers to U.S. exports. In the past ten years Canada has imposed
antidumping duties on twenty U.S. products.' In 1984, U.S. exports of
these products, again at presumably a much lower rate than would have
otherwise been the case, totaled $346 million, despite the continued exist-
ence of a majority of the dumping orders. I do not know what this seem-
ing disparity in the level of affected trade in each country means. It may
well mean that Canadian antidumping remedies are more effective than
U.S. antidumping remedies.
The antidumping remedy laws in both countries address the practice
of selling goods for export at prices which are below their home market
price, or some arbitrary "foreign market value" if home market price is
not useful for one of several reasons. These sales must cause material
injury to an industry in the importing country.
Steel reinforcing bar (1963);
Sugar & Syrups (1980).
5 The following have been determinations under the Antidumping Act of Canada against the
United States:
Artificial decorative brick (1975-79);
Gasoline powered chain saws (1975-80);
Gymnasium equipment (1976-80);
Textured/bulk polyester filament yarn (1976);
Disposable electrodes (1976);
National color acrylic fiber (1976-81);
Maleic anhydride (1977-82);
Slate-bed billiard tables (1977);
Integral induction motors (1978);
Polypropylene, homopolymer and copolymer resins (1978);
Radioactive diagnostic reagents (1978);
Custom wheel rims (1979);
Citric acid & sodium citrate (1979);
Vehicle washing equipment (1980);
Organic peroxide (1980);
Multi-link key telephone system intercoms (1980);
Bottoming materials (1982);
Band saw blades (1982);
Pipe & tubing (1983);
High voltage insulators (1984).
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Other U.S. trade remedy statutes which have had significant effects
on trade (although insofar as U.S.-Canadian trade is concerned, none of
the others have in the past matched the antidumping statutes) include:
the countervailing duty law (CVD), which is used to offset foreign sub-
sidy practices causing material injury; Section 301, which can be used to
retaliate against "unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory trade
practices by foreign countries"; and Section 201, the so-called "Escape
Clause" or "Safeguard Provision" of U.S. law, which can be used to pro-
vide temporary relief to U.S. industries suffering "serious injury," a "sub-
stantial cause" of which is increased imports of the article under
scrutiny. There are also provisions of law concerning threats to national
security and violations of intellectual property rights, but they have not,
in the past, proved to be major impediments to Canadian exports.
In recent times, there have been four countervailing duty determina-
tions against Canadian products, all of which have been revoked.6 In
addition, there is now pending a U.S. investigation concerning live swine
and pork products, which involves over $400 million in 1984 imports
from Canada into the U.S. While CVD investigations such as this one
can effect significant amounts of trade, they generate even more interna-
tional friction because of the nature of the inquiry they involve and their
threat to whole sectors and industries.
In the pork case, the U.S. Commerce Department has preliminarily
determined that Canadian price support programs, including price stabi-
lization payments under the Agricultural Stabilization Act, are subsidies.
These programs are applied to a number of other agricultural products in
Canada. Over the years, U.S. investigations of Canadian products have
looked at: regional development assistance to industries provided by both
federal and provincial agencies; fishing boat construction loans and pro-
grams; the operation of the Canadian national railroads; and the prices
charged to private lumber companies for stumpage owned by the Cana-
dian government, to name just a few.
Obviously when fundamental economic and social programs such as
these are being questioned by a foreign government the potential for
cross-border acrimony is extremely high and not necessarily related to
the amount of trade involved. Furthermore, governments rightly fear
that a finding that one or more programs are "subsidies" will open a
whole range of exported products, which benefit from the same pro-
grams, to countervailing action. One has only to look at what has hap-
pened to U.S. trade with Brazil, which has been very heavily impacted by
a series of countervailing duty laws based upon the Brazilian subsidies
practices.
6 These have been:
Fish (1977-80);
Glass beads (1975-81);
Optic liquid sensing systems (1978-81);
Michelin X radial steel belted tires (1975-82).
[Vol. 10:141 1985]
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I am not maintaining that those were unjustifiable determinations,
but it does illustrate the point. Once a program or a series of programs
which affect a large area of trade have been exposed, American petition-
ers are quick to seize upon the advantage. I believe that attempts at an
international understanding on subsidies and countervailing duties
(which were a major part of the Tokyo Round) leave much to be desired.
The U.S. continues to be the only major trading nation to make
extensive use of its countervailing duty law, with little international disci-
pline on how it uses it. While the addition of a material injury require-
ment to the U.S. law, as a result of the Tokyo Round, has defused some
criticism, the fact remains that of all the world's trading nations, the U.S.
(at least conceptually) is the least interventionist. As a result, the poten-
tial for conflict over foreign government assistance to industry remains
very high.
As regards the safeguard provision, Section 201, it has been used
rather sparingly over the years, because it gives the President complete
discretion, and because exporting countries can demand compensation
for measures taken under this provision to contain imports, unlike ac-
tions taken under the GAT for dumping or CVD, where no compensa-
tion or retaliation is possible.
Restraints have been imposed by the President eleven times over the
past ten years. The most troublesome to Canada has been the quantita-
tive restrictions on specialty steel, imposed in 1983, resulting from an
escape clause action. These restrictions have remained a source of irrita-
tion since that time. Orderly marketing agreements however, outside a
formal action under the law, are becoming more common. For example,
export restraints on Japanese autos, and carbon steel products from eight
countries, have been negotiated outside the processes of 201.
There is a growing tendency in U.S. trade remedy administration to
blur the distinction between "fair" and "unfair" trade practices. There is
the case of the automobile restraints, for example. There was a 201 find-
ing, but the investigation by the ITC resulted in a finding of no injury-
and the President went and negotiated voluntary restraint arrangements
with the Japanese. In the 1984 case of carbon steel, there was an ITC
finding of injury, but the President decided not to apply it. He refused to
agree with the ITC finding and then went and negotiated voluntary re-
straint arrangements.
In 1982, in a case well known in Canada, concerning specialty steel,
there was a very strange series of events. Originally, an action was filed
under section 301, which is an unfair trade practice remedy. After a year
had passed, the Executive branch decided it did not want to take action
under 301 and sent the matter over to the ITC saying "this really is not
an unfair trade practice case." The ITC found injury under 201, the
safeguard provision, and then the President, in implementing the relief
under 201, made it clear that he was doing so based upon unfair trade
practices. The whole distinction between the fair and unfair trade stat-
11
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utes has become very blurred. It is almost inevitable now that, when a
petitioner files a section 201 fair trade practice case, the first thing he
does is allege unfair trade practices.
Section 301, as amended, provides the President with more or less
unlimited authority to retaliate against actions by foreign governments
which restrict or burden U.S. commerce, including services. He may
take action against the services or products of a specific country, or on a
non-discriminatory basis. Fortunately, 301 action has remained discre-
tionary with the President and, as a result, thus far actions have been few
and far between.
There have been four cases in recent years involving Canada. One
has been terminated (a 1976 case involving eggs), two are pending (one
on front-end loaders and one on soybeans, both initiated in 1982), and
one resulted in the only retaliation under section 301 that has ever been
taken against any country. This was the so-called "border broadcasting
case," which resulted in the U.S. Congress adopting legislation that mir-
rors the Canadian legislation (which started the whole thing in the first
place).
Section 403 of the Tariff and Trade Act of 1984, which authorized
the Israeli arrangement and which would presumably be the authority
for a U.S.-Canadian agreement, specifically provides that the section 201
process would continue to apply. The President may suspend the reduc-
tion or elimination of the duty as part of section 201 Escape Clause pro-
cess. Further, the U.S. International Trade Commission shall specifically
address the issue of whether such reductions or eliminations have con-
tributed to any serious injury suffered by a domestic industry.
Section 404 provides, also, for "fast-track" relief when perishable
products (defined by section 404(e)) are involved. Under this procedure,
duty reductions provided through an agreement can be withdrawn by the
President within twenty-one days of the filing of the petition. Further-
more, this provision of law specifically says that the authority is not to be
used by the President to negotiate any modification in the trade remedy
laws in the United States. Although this provision applies only to the
Israeli Agreement, it is safe to say that something similar would be in the
minds of the Congress when it came to U.S.-Canadian arrangements.
The conventional wisdom is that it will not be possible to obtain
major revisions in these U.S. statutes as part of any U.S.-Canada free-
trade agreements (or reciprocally, in their Canadian counterparts). I be-
lieved the attempt should be made, however, given the increasing reli-
ance of the U.S. on these measures, which indicates a trend to legalistic
or procedural protectionism (what has been termed contingency
protectionism).
The evolution of the unfair trade laws, in 1974, 1979, and to some
degree in 1984, has made them more and more protectionist and less and
less discretionary within a particular branch of the government. Logi-
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cally, some modification is called for. The differing views of the U.S. and
Canada regarding government participation in commercial enterprises
would seem to doom any attempt to redefine the meaning of "subsidy"
for CVD purposes- and the Escape Clause and the 301 provisions are
currently viewed as sacrosanct. It would, however, be worthwhile with
regard to CVD to attempt to negotiate an agreed list of practices so that
those which both governments engage in would not be treated as
subsidies.
A strong argument can be made on economic terms that the applica-
tion of antidumping duties, after the creation of a "North American mar-
ket" by the elimination of duties, makes no sense, and that the
integration of U.S. and Canadian industries must be considered in every
action. Given the proximity of the principal markets in the two coun-
tries, price discrimination practiced by eastern Canadian producers in
the eastern part of the U.S. would probably be less troublesome than
similar practices by U.S. producers from California. With the non-taxed
flow of goods across the border a producer in Toronto who dumps in
Detroit would soon be competing in his home market with his own lower
priced exports. To the degree that the Canadian (U.S.) manufacturer
behaves as a domestic producer in the U.S. (Canadian) market, he should
be considered as such in determining whether his products are injurious.
It is unrealistic to expect Congress to agree that the Antidumping
Act, or any of these other statutes, should not apply to Canadian goods.
However, it might be possible to agree to modifications in the material
injury tests of the antidumping and CVD laws. Congress should require
that the ITC explore, in the initial stages of the investigation, the effects
of Canadian and U.S. sales on this binational marketplace; and give con-
sideration to geographic factors to a far greater extent than is now their
practice. If producers from Ontario and New England are "dumping" in
the U.S. southeast, and the Canadians are acting no differently than
American producers, they ought not to be penalized. The industry in the
U.S. should be defined as including Canadian producers who behave like
domestic producers, and U.S. producers should be treated similarly in
Canada.
Escape clause and 301 actions are largely discretionary, and any ac-
tions by the President can be tailored to recognize the new economic
relationship between the U.S. and Canada, although obviously it would
be desirable if the statutes could be amended so as to take account of
economic and commercial integration. For instance, in section 201
cases, a requirement that Canadian imports be an identifiable cause of
serious injury might be added, along with an instruction to the ITC to
determine whether a truly integrated North American industry exists. If
it does, Canadian goods should be excluded from any relief.
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V. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
The Buy American Act,7 as implemented by Executive Orders No.
10582 and No. 11051, provides for a "preference" of 6% for U.S. prod-
ucts, when purchased by U.S. federal agencies. That is, foreign products
must be at least 6% cheaper, on a duty paid basis, than the U.S. product,
in order to obtain the contract. A 12% preference is generally applied to
bids by small or minority owned businesses (or those located in labor
surplus areas, as designated by the Secretary of Labor). The Department
of Defense uses a 50% differential for certain of its purchases.
The Surface Transportation Act of 19828 requires that, for federally
funded highway and urban mass transportation projects costing over
$500 thousand, only domestic materials can be used, unless costs are in-
creased by more than 10% by doing so or if U.S. materials are unavaila-
ble. Various Defense Department appropriation acts prohibit the
purchase of certain specific non-U.S. items by that agency. These include
hand-tools, articles of cotton or wool clothing, food products, and silk
yam for cartridge cloth. Other statutes prohibit the purchase of foreign
built naval vessels.
There are certain exceptions to these prohibitions. The implementa-
tion of the GATT Government Procurement Code in the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979' authorized the President to waive, on a reciprocal
basis, U.S. laws limiting procurement with respect to products from
countries which are parties to the Code. Furthermore, the Buy Ameri-
can Act does not apply to certain products purchased by the Dept. of
Defense, NASA, or the Coast Guard, if they are from approved Cana-
dian sources.
Total federal purchases of goods in 1984 were $85.5 billion. Based
on a study of purchases for 1979,10 it appears that in 1984 about $17
billion of non-strategic goods purchased were subject to government pro-
curement restrictions. Obviously, these laws remain significant barriers
to the U.S. market, even for Canadian producers who enjoy a preferential
status vis-a-vis other foreign suppliers.
However, it seems that a precedent already exists for the preferential
treatment of Canada. Canada has been granted special status under U.S.
procurement statutes, and there is precedent for seeking to expand that
status to one of total exclusion, on a reciprocal basis, in the context of a
comprehensive free-trade arrangement. Presumably, product specific ex-
clusion could be considered if sectoral integration were pursued. Of
course, these concessions will not be easily extracted from the United
7 The Buy-American Act, 41 U.S.C. §10 (1982).
8 Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 23 U.S.C. §101 (1982), 49 U.S.C.S. §1602
(Law Co-op. 1985).
9 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.S. §160 (Law. Co-op. 1983).
10 See P. Morici & L. Megna, U.S. Economic Policies Affecting Industrial Trade: A Quantitative
Assessment, NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION, REPORT No. 200 (1983).
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States. There is also the problem with local government procurement
which does not seem easily resolvable.
VI. OTHER PERTINENT STATUTES
There are a myriad of other statutes which affect the importation of
certain products. Some of these can be extremely significant. For exam-
ple, section 207 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, which establishes
certain country of origin marking requirements for pipes and pipe fit-
tings, requires that the marking be by means of "die stamping, cast-in-
mold lettering, etching or engraving." This requirement has caused a
major flap in U.S. relations with several trading partners, including Can-
ada, because of claims that marking the product in this way renders it
unuseable for some purposes. Efforts have been made in the Congress to
have the statute amended.
Many of these laws are directed at agricultural products. The Meat
Import Act of 197911 requires the imposition of quotas, or the negotia-
tion of voluntary restraint arrangements (VRA) with major supplying
countries. In 1982 and 1983, VRAs were in fact negotiated with Austra-
lia, New Zealand and Canada. Sugar quotas are imposed under Presi-
dential proclamation as part of the U.S. implementation of the Kennedy
Round Agreement on Sugar.
In addition, quotas and/or fees may be imposed under section 22 of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193812 in order to prevent imports
which "render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with"
any U.S. Department of Agriculture price support or similar program or
"reduce substantially the amount of any product processed in the United
States from any agricultural commodity or product" which is the subject
of such a program. In recent years, import quotas and/or fees have been
placed on cotton, certain dairy products, peanuts, and sugar as a result of
section 22 actions.
The Agricultural Marketing Act of 193713 provides for marketing
orders issued by U.S. producers through the Dept. of Agriculture. It
regulates the quality and quantity of particular commodities which can
be marketed regionally in the U.S. during specific time periods. Com-
modities imported from Canada which are subject to these orders ($48.7
million, in 1984) include onions, potatoes, tomatoes, grapes and raisins.
There are a number of other statutes which are intended to protect
the consumer's health and welfare from unsanitary or dangerous im-
ports. There are labeling requirements, intended to provide the con-
sumer with information about the product. And, there are inspection
requirements for equipment and automotive products, which must meet
U.S. standards.
11 Meat Import Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C.S. §1202 (Law Co-op. 1985).
12 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. §1281 (1982).
13 Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C.S. §601 (Law Co-op. 1985).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Many of these federal statutes are not going to be affected by the
negotiation of a free-trade arrangement, whether sectoral or comprehen-
sive. However, several ought to be, if the two countries are to move to-
ward real industrial integration, rather than simply tariff cutting. It can
be argued that, for the most part, tariffs are not particularly significant
anyway. 75% of the trade between the U.S. and Canada is (or will be by
1987) duty free and duties on the remainder are relatively insignificant in
a flexible exchange rate world. Of course, some high tariffs remain on
import sensitive products and these do have commercial effect.
Certainly, it would be a major step in the direction of true integra-
tion if each party could agree to granting the other special consideration
in determining whether to impose additional tariffs or quotas under cer-
tain of these laws. Modifications could be made in the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws. A bilateral agreement to reduce the scope of
the trade remedy laws of the United States might be the opening wedge
in an effort to have them reconsidered globally and help reverse the trend
toward legalistic protectionism, so prevalent in the United States and to
some degree in Canada.
It remains to be seen whether sufficient political will exists on both
sides of the border to turn any agreement into more than a tariff cutting
exercise.
Thank you.
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